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ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment may be granted

if the trial court determines that the pleadings and evidence demonstrate "that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). Any doubts or uncertainties regarding whether issues
of fact are genuinely disputed must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Atlas
Corp. v. Clovis National Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
The issue in this case is whether genuine issues of material fact exist; not, as
argued by the Appellees, what the eventual standard of proof at trial would be. See
Appellee's Brief, pp. 9. Appellate courts in Utah have long held that a trial court should not
weigh disputed evidence in considering motions for summary judgment, but "its sole inquiry
should be whether material issues of fact exist." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909
P.2d 1283,1292 (Utah App. 1996V (citing Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888P.2d 1097,
1100 (Utah 1995)). This Court quoted the Bernardo court as follows:
"[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of
the averments of the parties, or witnesses, or the weight of the evidence. Neither is it
to deny the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate
the time, trouble[,] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail."
Id., at 1101 (citing Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975). Likewise, this
Court quoted the Holbrook court for the principle that "it only takes one sworn statement
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under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue
of fact. Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1292 (quoting Holbrooke 542 P.2d at 193).
II.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST
The parties do not dispute the elements necessary to maintain an action for malicious

prosecution. They are:
(1) A criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the
plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of
probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) malice, or a primary purpose other than
that of bringing an offender to justice.
America Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah App. 1989). This is
perhaps the only matter in which there is no dispute between the parties.
The elements for malicious prosecution involve fact-sensitive issues. "Fact-sensitive
cases . . . do not lend themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Draper City v.
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1101. The Appellants' and Appellees' briefs demonstrate,
as does the record on appeal, that genuinely disputed issues exist between the parties.
A.

Probable Cause

Meshwerks claims that Agler and Olson 1) took property of Meshwerks; 2) knew the
property was proprietary; and 3) took the propriety without the knowledge or consent of
Meshwerks. Appellee's Brief, p. 12. Agler and Olson asserted that they made copies of
programs, scripts and files, with Meshwerks' knowledge and took them out of the office so
they could work on them outside of the office. R. 484-485, 491-492. Meshwerks loaded
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software onto Olson's computer. R. 485. Meshwerks never expressed a concern or
disapproval about this practice, but in fact supported it. R. 484-485, 491-492.
Agler and Olson denied stealing "tools" from Meshwerks. R. 486-487, 492-494.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Agler and Olson took any tools, they believed that
Meshwerk consented to employees copying and taking such tools with them when they left
employment at Meshwerks. R. 486, 493.
Immediately before leaving employment with Meshwerks, Agler copied the models
he had made. R. 493. This demonstrates that Agler did not believe the models belonged to
Meshwerks, and/or that he had permission to do so based on Meshwerks5 prior conduct
implying consent to copy the models. Olson and Agler testified that they had implied consent
to copy models and take them home to work on them, and that Meshwerks never expressed
any concern about this practice. R. 487, 494. Meshwerks failure to express any concern
about this practice could reasonably connote that they had permission to take the information.
Agler and Olson denied that the models were proprietary. R. 453. The lack of
concern or disapproval of copying files, and the lack of any confidentiality agreements, nondisclosure and/or non-compete agreements, policies, procedures, guidelines or writings of
any kind stating that the models, scripts, files, preferences, etc., were proprietary, to be
safeguarded, kept confidential or otherwise protected gives rise to a reasonable inference that
such information was not proprietary. Moreover, the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, Central Division in Meshwerks. Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A.. Inc.. et
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aL, recently ruled that models at issue were not copyrightable by Meshwerks because the
digital models created by Meshwerks were not original. See, Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., etal, Order & Memorandum Decision, Case No. 2:06 CV 97, page
9, September 12, 2006. A copy of the decision is attached in the Addendum to this brief.
The foregoing manifests the genuine dispute regarding whether probable cause existed
for Meshwerks to initiate criminal proceedings against Agler and Olson. Accordingly, it was
error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Meshwerks.
B.

Malice

Meshwerks asserts there was no malice in initiating a criminal action against Agler
and Olson. Appellees5 Brief, pp. 1920. Olson believed that Meshwerks' reporting of
criminal action was not based on fact, but on Meshwerks5 ill-feeling about them leaving their
employment with Meshwerks and a potential loss of income for Meshwerks. R. 489. Agler
and Olson sought additional time to conduct discovery on the issues raised in Meshwerks5
summary judgment motion, and to show that Meshwerks acted with malice in reporting that
Agler and Olson committed theft. R. 475-477.
Utah courts have held that the malice element is an inherently factual issue and must
go to the jury for determination. See, e ^ , Uhr. v. Eaton, 80 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah 1938)
(stating, whether defendant acted maliciously in accusing plaintiff of poisoning defendant's
dog was an issue for the jury); Thomas v. Frost, 27 P.2d 459,463 (Utah 1933) (stating, where
there was evidence, though contradicted, that defendant in presenting matter to county
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attorney did not make truthful statement of facts, the question of malice held for the jury).
The Utah Supreme Court has also held, "In proving malice in a civil action it is not
necessary to prove actual spite, ill will, or grudge, but it is only necessary to prove wrongful
or improper motive" Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enterprises. Inc.. 460 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah
1969) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court further held:
To sustain a charge of malicious prosecution, proof of evil motive, hatred, spite or ill
will is not necessarily required, although because of difficulty of overt proof of such
matters, evil motive may be implied from the wrongful act of filing a criminal
complaint without reasonable justification for doing so.
Potter v. Utah Drive-Ur-Self System. Inc.. 355 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1960). Also, "Malice
may be implied or inferred from want of probable cause." Quermbeck v. Hanson. 75 P.2d
1027, 1030 (Utah 1938). As argued in Agler' and Olson's Appellants' Brief and before the
trial court, issues of fact exist regarding whether Meshwerks had a "wrongful or improper
motive" in instituting the criminal action against Plaintiffs. Those issues included negative
financial impact to Meshwerks by Agler's and Olson's departure, unwanted competition from
Agler and Olson, loss of expertise and leadership at Meshwerks with Agler's and Olson's
departure, evidence of Meshworks' malice based on comments made by witnesses to Agler
and Olson, and inconsistencies between information in Meshwerks' police report and
testimony in the trial court. R. 472-473, 476.
Whether Meshwerks acted with malice in instituting a criminal action against Agler
and Olson was and is a disputed material fact making summary judgment improper.
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C.

Abuse of Process

As set forth above, genuine issues existed as to whether Meshwerks acted with an
ulterior or improper purpose in instituting a criminal action charging Agler and Olson with
theft. R. 472-473, 476, 487, 489. Hence, summary judgment on this issue was improper.
Meshwerk's report of Agler and Olson committing theft (use of process) was contrary
to practices of allowing employees to copy and take files, models, preferences and tools.
Meshwerks knew that Agler and Olson did not take tools. Meshwerks knew that the
information/property at issue was not proprietary, particularly when it took no steps to
safeguard such information. A genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether Meshwerks
abused legal process in accusing Agler and Olson of theft.
III.

DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' RULE 56(f) MOTION
Meshwerks argues that this issue is not properly reviewable by this Court because

Agler and Olson failed to request a transcript of the hearing held March 6, 2006, regarding
the summary judgment motion and Rule 56(f) motion. Meshwerks provides no authority to
support this argument.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2) requires a transcript of all evidence
regarding a challenged finding or conclusion by the trial court. No evidence was presented
at the March 6, 2006 hearing. It was an oral argument hearing. R. 517, 519, 522.
Meshwerks did not oppose Agler's and Olson's Rule 56(f) motion. No findings or
conclusions were entered by the trial court in denying the motion, so it is unclear why the
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trial court did so. R. 523-524.
Meshwerks next argues that the trial court properly denied Agler's and Olson's Civil
Rule 56 (f) motion because they were dilatory in pursuing discovery. Appellees' Brief, pp.
This claim is without merit.
The complaint was filed in the trial court on May 31,2005. R. 1-7. The answer was
filed July 11, 2005. R. 14-16. The Case Management Order was entered on August 29,
2005. R. 17-19. The parties exchanged initial disclosures the end of September and
designated witnesses during the first two-and-a-half weeks in October, 2005. R. 20-26. The
Case Management Order set a discovery completion date of January 31, 2006. Agler and
Olson served Meshwerks with their First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production
on October 20,2005, and that Meshwerks served their responses on November 14,2005. R.
27-29. Meshwerks then filed its motion for summary judgment on November 16,2005. R.
30-397. Agler and Olson filed their oppostion to the motion for summary judgment and their
Rule 56(f) motion on December 16,2005. R. 451-496. Meshwerks filed its reply to Agler's
and Olson's opposition to the summary judgment motion, but filed no opposition to their
Rule 56(f) motion. R. 497-506.
Trial courts should liberally grant Rule 56(f) motions requesting a continuance to
complete discovery before ruling on a motion for summary judgment unless the Rule 56(f)
motion is dilatory or lacking in merit. Price Development Co., L.P. v. Orem City, 995 P.2d
1237, 1248 (Utah 2000), Salt Lake City v. Western Dairvment Cooperative. Inc.. 48 P.3d
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910, 917 (Utah 2002). Here, Meshwerks did not oppose the Rule 56(f) motion, or argue in
the trial court that it was dilatory or lacking in merit, but raises it now for the first time on
appeal. Meshwerks does not allege or argue that it was plain error for the trial court not to
rule that Agler's and Olson's Rule 56(f) motion was dilatory or lacking merit, or that
exceptional circumstances exist to raise if for the first time on appeal; nor could it credibly
do so. Accordingly this argument should not be considered by this Court on appeal. Walter
v. Stewart, 67 P.3d 1042, 1049, (Utah App. 2003), cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 (2003).
Where a Rule 56(f) motion is not meritless or dilatory on its face, the requesting party
has properly invoked the trial court's discretion, and the matter must be reversed and
remanded for consideration on the merits of the motion. Energy Management Services,
L.L.C.v. Shaw, 110 P.3d 158,160-61 (Utah App. 2005). Meshwerks has not argued that the
motion was meritless. The record in this matter demonstrates that Agler and Olson followed
a reasonable course in filing the Rule 56(f) motion given the procedural status of the case.
Id., at 161. They had initiated discovery proceedings and received Meshwerks' responses
just two days before receiving the motion for summary judgment. R. 27-29, 32. They filed
the Rule 56(f) motion along with their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. R.
451-480. Agler and Olson were not dilatory.
Agler and Olson reasonably relied on Meshwerks' non-opposition to the Rule 56(f)
motion in not conducting further discovery between January 6,2006, the date of Meshwerks'
filing its reply to Agler's and Olson's opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and
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the January 31, 2006 discovery completion deadline. Thus, based on the short time period
between the filing of the complaint and the filing of its motion for summary judgment, and
the extensiveness of the motion, that the Rule 56(f) motion was not dilatory or lacking in
merit.
Given there was no opposition by Meshwerks, and no finding or conclusion by the
trial court that the Rule 56(f) motion was dilatory or lacking in merit, the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, the denial of the motion must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Appellants' Brief and in this Reply Brief, genuine
issues of material fact existed which precluded the trial court's granting summary judgment
to Meshwerks. Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Agler's and Olson's
Rule 56(f) motion. Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse the trial court's
Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Rule
56(f) motion, and the subsequent Judgment dismissing Appellants' complaint with prejudice.
RESEPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 J - day ofSeptember, 2006.
HILL, JOffifS(^Ufe-SGHMUTZ, L.C.

Stephen E. Quesenbeffy
E^/Sc^t Davis
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

^

MESHWERKS, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER & MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A., INC, a
California corporation, GRACE & WILD,
INC., d/b/a "DIVISION X," a Michigan
corporation, 3D RECON, L.L.C, a Utah
limited liability company, SAATCHI &
SAATCHI NORTH AMERICA, INC, a
California corporation, and JOHN DOES 110,

Case No. 2:06 CV 97

Defendants.

This motion raises the question of whether copyright law protects three-dimensional
digital models of commercial products when the digital models are intended to resemble the
commercial product as closely as possible. Plaintiff Meshwerks, Inc., was hired by Defendant
Grace & Wild, Inc. to create digital models of several Toyota vehicles. After completing the
project, Meshwerks obtained copyright registration certificates covering the models. Meshwerks
contends that Defendants Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., Grace & Wild, 3D Recon, L.L.C,
and Saatchi & Saatchi North America, Inc. (collectively, the "Toyota Defendants") violated
Meshwerks's copyright by impermissibly using the models that Meshwerks created. Meshwerks
also alleges that Grace & Wild failed to fully pay Meshwerks for the digital modeling that it
performed.
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Document 44

Filed 09/13/2006

Page 2 of 10

The Toyota Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright
infringement claims, asserting that the digital models created by Meshwerks are not
copyrightable. Further, the Toyota Defendants argue that, should they succeed on their motion
for summary judgment, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Meshwerks's remaining state law claim for breach of contract. The court agrees with the Toyota
Defendants' position and therefore grants the motion for summary judgment and declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Meshwerks's breach of contract claim.
Background
As part of its advertising strategy, Toyota Motor Sales and its advertising agent, Saatchi
& Saatchi sought out a company to create three-dimensional animated images of several Toyota
vehicles. Toyota planned on using the models on the Internet and in several other types of
promotional media. Saatchi & Saatchi contacted Grace & Wild and asked it to develop the
images. Grace & Wild, in turn, hired Meshwerks to create three-dimensional digital models of
the Toyota vehicles that would be used to create the final images.
The parties present different descriptions of the digital-modeling process. The Toyota
Defendants assert that the use of off-the-shelf computer software enables the quick creation of
product-accurate models. In contrast, Meshwerks claims that computer software is used to create
an initial rough sketch of an object, but that "the skill and creativity of the graphic sculptor," who
uses computer software as a tool, creates the final product. (Plf.'s Memo, in Opp'n to the Toyota
Defs. Mot. for Part. Summ. J. ii (dkt. #19).)
Meshwerks began the modeling process by measuring the physical distance between
designated points on each Toyota vehicle. To accomplish this task, Meshwerks placed tape in a
grid pattern over each car and then, using an articulated arm measuring over six feet, marked
2
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each point at which the tape intersected. The distance between the points of intersection was
then measured and inputted into a computer. Using the measurements as a guide, the computer
software then created lines that formed a rough digital representation of the vehicle, resembling a
wireframe model.1
According to Meshwerks, the individual creating the digital model must manipulate the
data initially obtained from the vehicle measurements to effectively create the illusion of a threedimensional image on a two-dimensional screen in the most efficient manner possible. Given the
necessity of manipulating the data obtained through measurement alone, Meshwerks disputes the
Toyota Defendants' characterization of the final digital models as absolutely product accurate. In
fact, Meshwerks contends that truly product-accurate models would be worthless because they
would not create the desired three-dimensional effect. In short, Meshwerks asserts that the
modeling process is a creative one, and that the creative nature of the process is borne out by the
fact that no two digital models of an object will be exactly alike.
After finishing the vehicle models, Meshwerks provided the digital files to Saatchi &
Saatchi. Meshwerks also made a print-out of the data comprising each of the digital files and
sought copyright protection of the material, claiming that the print-outs represented
copyrightable non-dramatic literary works or computer programs. The United States Copyright
Office issued copyright registration certificates to Meshwerks covering the submitted files.
Meshwerks's copyright infringement claim is based on Meshwerks's belief that the
digital models it created have been distributed among the Toyota Defendants and that those

'According to Meshwerks, some components of the vehicles, such as the vehicles' headlights, could not be
measured. Meshwerks took photographs of those components and then, using the photographs for reference,
created the wireframe model of the components from scratch.
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models have been used repeatedly without Meshwerks's permission. The Toyota Defendants
claim that summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright infringement claims is warranted
because the digital models are not entitled to copyright protection.
Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670
(10th Cir. 1998). The court must "examine the factual record and reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Applied
Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec, Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990).
The parties do not truly dispute the material facts underlying Meshwerks's copyright
claim. Rather, the parties dispute the manner in which those facts are characterized. The only
disagreement between the parties concerns whether the process of creating the digital models is
dominated by creativity or technical know-how. But even the Toyota Defendants acknowledge
that the modeling process is not entirely mechanical in nature. (See Reply Memo, in Supp. of
Defs. Mot. for Part. Summ. J. 11 (dkt. #25) ("In a manner of speaking, it took 'creative
judgments' to decide how best to depict the three-dimensional Vehicle in a two-dimensional
display.").) The parties' disagreement concerning the accurate characterization of the modeling
process does not preclude the entry of summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright
infringement claim. This is so because, even if Meshwerks's characterization of the modeling

4
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process is accepted as accurate, the digital models are nevertheless not copyrightable.2
Accordingly this matter can be resolved on summary judgment. See Magic Mktg., Inc. v.
Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Pa. 1986) ("The issue of
copyrightability is typically resolved by a motion for summary judgment."); cf Sem-Torq, Inc.
v K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Copyrightability is often resolved on
summary judgment.").
Analysis
I. Copyright Infringement
The Copyright Act provides that "[cjopyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). "To qualify for copyright protection, a work
must be original to the author." Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991) (citing Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc. v. Nat. Enterps., 471 U.S. 539, 547-49 (1985)). In fact,
originality is "[t]he sine qua non of copyright." Id. The requirement of originality is met if the
author created the work and the creation involved a creative component. Slee id. ("Original. . .
means only that the work was independently created by the author . .. and . .. possesses at least
some minimal degree of creativity."). With regard to the presence of creativity, the United States
Supreme Court has stated: "To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a

2

Meshwerks filed a motion to strike portions of the declaration of Brent Feeman, which was submitted by
the Toyota Defendants in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. In an apparent attempt to address
the concerns raised by Meshwerks, the Toyota Defendants responded by submitting a supplemental declaration of
Mr Feeman But Meshwerks contends that the supplemental declaration suffers from deficiencies similar to those
present in Mr Feeman's first declaration Nevertheless, because the court does not rely on the paragraphs of Mr
Feeman's declaration that Meshwerks seeks to strike and because the court adopts Meshwerks's recitation and
characterization of the digital modeling process, the motion to strike Mr Feeman's declaration is denied as moot

5
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slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they
possess some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble, or obvious it might be." Id. (internal
quotation omitted).
The parties devote some time in their briefs to the presence of a presumption of copyright
protection flowing from the registration certificates obtained by Meshwerks. See Grundberg v.
Upjohn Co., 137 F.R.D. 372, 382 (D. Utah 1991) ("The registration certificate is prima
facie evidence of copyright validity.") The effect of the presumption in this case is not in
dispute. The Toyota Defendants have the burden of proving that the digital models created by
Meshwerks are not copyrightable. See id. ("[T]he presumption is not absolute: 'possession of a
registration certificate creates a rebuttable presumption that the work in question is
copyrightable.'" (quoting Whimsicality Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir.
1989))). The Toyota Defendants attack the copyrightability of the Meshwerks models on
creativity grounds, contending that the models fail to "make the grade," because they do not
exhibit the "creative spark" that serves as the necessary predicate for copyright protection, Feist,
499 U.S. at 345.
In support of their position, the Toyota Defendants cite ATC Distribution Group, Inc. v.
Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005), in which an auto
parts dealer claimed that a competitor copied illustrations used in an auto parts catalog. See id. at
702-03, 712. The illustrations in ATC Distribution Group were "hand-drawn sketches of
transmissions parts," that were originally "copied from photographs cut out of competitors'
catalogs." Id. In reaching the conclusion that the hand-drawn illustrations were not entitled to
copyright protection, the Sixth Circuit focused on the lack of creative intent, stating that "[t]he
illustrations were intended to be as accurate as possible in reproducing the parts shown in the
6
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photographs on which they were based, a form of slavish copying that is the antithesis of
originality." Id. (citing J. Thomas Distribs. v. Greenline Distribs., 100 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 1996),
available at No. 95-2100, 1996 WL 636138 at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1996) (unpublished opinion)
("Plaintiffs spindle bearing was drawn with the express intention of duplicating on paper the
appearance of an actual spindle bearing. Its reproduction involved absolutely no creative spark
whatsoever.")).
Meshwerks contends that its modeling process involved much more that mere "slavish
copying," id Instead, Meshwerk analogizes its process to that undertaken by commercial
photographers. In particular, Meshwerks relies on SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117
F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), in which the court held that product photographs of mirrored
picture frames were entitled to copyright protection, id. at 311.
The court in SHL Imaging, Inc. began its analysis with the acknowledgment that "[tjhere
is no uniform test to determine the copyrightability of photographs." Id. at 309-10. Citing the
"almost limitless creative potential" offered by the medium of photography, the court
commented that u[t]he elements that combine to satisfy Feist's minimal 'spark of creativity'
standard will necessarily vary depending on the photographer's creative choices." SHL Imaging,
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 310. The court went on to state that "[t]he cumulative impact of these
technical and artistic choices becomes manifest in renowned portraits, such as 'Oscar Wilde 18.'
The measure or originality becomes more difficult to gauge as one moves from sublime
expression to simple reproduction." Id.
The SHL Imaging, Inc. court viewed the product photographs that were the subject of the
parties' dispute as less than sublime expression, but much more than simple reproduction. See
id. at 311 ("While Lindner's works may not be as creative as a portrait by Dianne Arbus, they
7
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show artistic judgment and therefore meet the Feist standard."). In reaching its conclusion that
the product photographs were protected by copyright, the court focused on the artistic choices
made by the photographer. See id. at 311 ("What makes plaintiffs photographs original is the
totality of the precise lighting selection, angle of the camera, lens and filter selection.").
Nevertheless, the court noted that the copyright protection afforded to the photographs was
narrow, stating that "[pjlaintiff cannot prevent others from photographing the same frames, or
using the same lighting techniques and blue sky reflection in the mirrors[;]. . . [pjractically, the
plaintiffs works are only protected from verbatim copying." Id.
The models created by Meshwerks are more analogous to the illustrations in ATP
Distribution Group than to the photographs in SHL Imaging, Inc. The critical distinction
between the present case and SHL Imaging, Inc. is the lack of a creative recasting of the Toyota
vehicles. The photographer in SHL Imaging, Inc. used his camera to introduce new creative
elements that elevated his photographs beyond mere replication. The illustrators in ATC
Distribution Group, on the other hand, utilized their skill to reproduce, as accurately as possible,
the auto parts they were attempting to depict. Similarly, in this case, Meshwerks's intent was to
replicate, as exactly as possible, the image of certain Toyota vehicles. Although the tools used
by the illustrators in ATC Distribution Group vary from the digital-modeling tools used by
Meshwerks, the endeavor was identical: product-accurate representation without the introduction
of new creative elements.
Todd v. Montana Silversmiths, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (D. Colo. 2005), provides a
helpful example of the distinction drawn in copyright law between skilled craft and creative,
protectable, works. In Todd, a jewelry maker claimed that a competitor had impermissibly
copied jewelry that the plaintiff had designed to resemble barbed wire. Id. at 1111. The court
8
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concluded that the plaintiffs design was not protected by copyright law. See id. at 1113-14.
According to the Todd court, "[w]hile Plaintiff is no doubt a skilled artist capable of making
jewelry with a certain aesthetic appeal, she has failed to show what copyrightable features she
has added to her work to separate it from ordinary public domain barbed-wire." Id. at 1113. The
court, while acknowledging the skill and judgment involved in the design process, nevertheless
declined to extend copyright protection to the unoriginal result of that process, stating that "[t]he
fact remains that for all her aesthetic choices, the final arrangement of the elements in her jewelry
still corresponds to the arrangement of public domain barbed-wire." Id.
Like the jeweler in Todd, Meshwerks no doubt made many judgments that required both
skill and technical know-how. Those judgments may have even involved "creativity," as that
word is commonly used. But the digital models created by Meshwerks are not original. Just as
the jewelry in Todd ultimately corresponded to common barbed-wire, the digital models created
by Meshwerks correspond to the Toyota vehicles they were intended to represent. Accordingly,
Meshwerks's models are not protected by copyright law and the Toyota Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright claims.
II. State Law Claims
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) allows federal district courts to decline exercising jurisdiction over
state law claims when "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In this case, the only cause of action alleged by
Meshwerks that is not dependent on federal copyright law is a breach of contract claim against
Grace & Wild. Meshwerks's complaint does not allege that this court has original jurisdiction
over that contract claim. Given the court's ruling on Meshwerks's copyright claims, the court
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declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Meshwerks's contract claim. Accordingly,
Meshwerks's contract claim is dismissed.
Conclusion
Although a great deal of skill and effort was involved in the creation of Meshwerks's
three-dimensional digital models, those models do not meet the originality requirement
established by copyright law. Accordingly, the models are not entitled to copyright protection.
As a result, the Toyota Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright
claims. Further, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Meshwerks's
breach of contract claim and that claim is therefore dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the Toyota Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and Dismissal of Remaining Claim (dkt. #11) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Feeman Declaration (dkt. #17) is DENIED as moot.

DATED this 12th day of September, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

TENA CAMPBELL
United States District Judge
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